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Abstract—We study a problem of privacy-preserving mecha-
nism design. A data collector wants to obtain data from individ-
uals to perform some computations. To relieve the privacy threat
to the contributors, the data collector adopts a privacy-preserving
mechanism by adding random noise to the computation result,
at the cost of reduced accuracy. Individuals decide whether to
contribute data when faced with the privacy issue. Due to the
intrinsic uncertainty in privacy protection, we model individuals’
privacy-related decision using Prospect Theory. Such a theory
more accurately models individuals’ behavior under uncertainty
than the traditional expected utility theory, whose prediction
always deviates from practical human behavior. We show that the
data collector’s utility maximization problem involves a polyno-
mial of high and fractional order, the root of which is difficult to
compute analytically. We get around this issue by considering
a large population approximation, and obtain a closed-form
solution that well approximates the precise solution. We discover
that the data collector who considers the more realistic Prospect
Theory based individual decision modeling would adopt a more
conservative privacy-preserving mechanism, compared with the
case based on the expected utility theory modeling. We also
study the impact of Prospect Theory parameters, and concludes
that more loss-averse or risk-seeking individuals will trigger a
more conservative mechanism. When individuals have different
Prospect Theory parameters, simulations demonstrate that the
privacy protection first becomes stronger and then becomes
weaker as the heterogeneity increases from a low value to a
high one.
Index Terms—Privacy protection, -differential privacy,
Prospect Theory
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Personal data collection is becoming increasingly common
in our daily life, in various industries such as online social
network and medical treatment, to better understand the indi-
viduals and gain new inspirations for knowledge generation.
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A privacy-aware individual, however, may have the privacy
concern when being requested for data contribution. He wor-
ries about potential personal information leakage if the data
collector does not provide enough privacy protection. A recent
example of this is the data leakage incident of Facebook due
to the illegal data usage of third party Cambridge Analytica
[2]. He would carefully evaluate the protection consequence
promised by the data collector.
The growing privacy concern brings great challenges to the
data collector regarding the data analysis. She1 conducts some
computations with collected data (e.g., exploiting individuals’
smoking habit to study its relation with the chance of get-
ting the lung cancer). She would adopt a privacy-preserving
mechanism, which adds some random noise to the computation
result such that an adversary cannot easily infer participants’
actual information. The downside is that the added noise will
reduce the accuracy of the result. For example, an inaccurate
average number of cigarettes that people smoke per day may
not fully indicate the accurate relation between the smoking
habit and lung cancer. The collector needs to carefully design
the privacy-preserving mechanism to trade off the individual
satisfaction and the computation accuracy.
One key feature of this privacy-preserving data collection
problem is the uncertainty of privacy protection level, as indi-
viduals are not always sure about the privacy level promised
by the data collector. As suggested in [3], [4], the uncertainty
of outcomes plays a significant role in privacy-related decision
making, and behavioral economics can help better understand
the individual’s decision concerning privacy. When dealing
with uncertainty, most prior studies applied the Expected
Utility Theory (EUT) to model an individual’s decision that
maximizes his expected utility. However, experimental evi-
dences (e.g., [5]) showed that in practice human behavior
could significantly deviate from the EUT, due to the complex
psychological perception and subjectivity [6]. This indicates
that the traditional EUT is not accurate enough to capture an
individual’s decision pattern.
Alternatively, Prospect Theory (PT) [5], [7], a Nobel-Prize-
Winning theory in behavioral economics, can provide a more
accurate prediction on an individual’s behavior. Supported
by a large number real-word experiments (e.g., [8], [9]),
Prospect Theory both normatively and descriptively interprets
how individuals make decisions by evaluating uncertain gains
and losses. This motivates us to consider Prospect Theory to
model individuals privacy-related decisions under uncertainty.
1In this paper, for the ease of presentation clarity, we will use “he” to
refer to an individual and use “she” to refer to the data collector. Such a
terminology choice does not reflect any gender bias.
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2Furthermore, Prospect Theory has been successfully applied
in many areas, such as cognitive radio network management
(e.g., [10], [11]) and smart grid management (e.g., [12], [13]).
However, there does not exist any theoretical studies regarding
the application of Prospect Theory in the area of privacy-
preserving mechanism design. Our paper presents the first step
towards this important and under-explored area.
In this paper, with prospect theoretic modeling, we will
explore the answers to the following key questions:
• From the individuals’ perspective, how would they decide
whether to participate in the data collection considering
the privacy protection uncertainty?
• From the data collector’s perspective, how would she
design the privacy-preserving mechanism considering the
individuals’ behavior?
To answer the above questions, we model the interaction
between the data collector and individual as a two-stage
Stackelberg game. At the lower level, we use Prospect Theory
to capture individuals’ subjective decision-making under the
privacy protection uncertainty. At the higher level, a better
privacy protection by the data collector will attract more
individuals, but the corresponding higher level of perturbation
(due to the added noise) will degrade the accuracy of the
analysis. We compute the data collector’s optimal strategy
based on her prediction of individuals’ participation decisions
to various privacy protection levels.
B. Key Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• Prospect Theory-based individual behavior model: Due
to the effectiveness uncertainty of the privacy-preserving
mechanism, we model individuals’ decisions based on
Prospect Theory, which is more accurate compared with
the widely adopted approach of EUT. In particular, we
focus on understanding the impact of both the level of
loss aversion and the shift of reference point.
• Analysis of the data collector’s utility maximization prob-
lem. Since this problem involves a polynomial of high
and fractional order, it is difficult to obtain the analytical
solution. We consider a large individual population ap-
proximation that allows us to compute a unique optimal
solution that is close to the optimal solution in realistic
settings.
• Design insights based on the impact of prospect theoretic
model: We compare the results under the prospect theo-
retic model and that under the EUT model, and conclude
that the data collector should adopt a more conservative
privacy-preserving mechanism based on Prospect Theory.
Regarding the impact of Prospect Theory parameters, we
find that more loss-averse individuals lead to a more
conservative privacy-preserving mechanism. However, the
shift of reference point towards a more tolerant attitude
does not always indicate a less conservative mecha-
nism. Taking into account the heterogeneity of different
individuals’ Prospect Theory parameters, we find that
the privacy protection first becomes stronger and then
becomes weaker as the heterogeneity increases from a
low value to a high one.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first
introduce the related work in Section II. In Section III, we
introduce the preliminaries of differential privacy, which is the
privacy metric that we use in this paper. In Section IV, we dis-
cuss the system model regarding the individual’s participation
problem and the data collector’s utility maximization problem,
respectively. In Section V, we solve these problems and
analyze the impact of different Prospect Theory parameters.
In Section VI and Section VII, we provide simulation results
and discuss the corresponding insights. We conclude the paper
in Section VIII.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The problem of privacy-preserving data collection has been
widely considered based on the concept of differential privacy
[14], which is regarded as a powerful tool to quantify privacy
in the literature (e.g., [15]–[20]). Differential privacy requires
that an individual’ data only has a limited impact on the output
of a computation, therefore it is hard for an adversary to infer
an individual’s data from the exposed output. Motivated by
this, we use differential privacy as the privacy model in this
paper. However, different from previous literature [15]–[20],
we model the individuals’ subjective reactions to the privacy
metric with Prospect Theory due to the intrinsic uncertainty.
Regarding the problem of privacy-preserving data collec-
tion, the studies in [15]–[22] considered a stylized case:
the data collector, with a certain computation goal, wants
to obtain the personal data from privacy-aware individuals.
However, the detailed problem model and analysis can be
different based on the incentive methods adopted by different
applications. There are mainly three categories: no incentive
(e.g., [15]), monetary payments (e.g., [16]–[20], [23]–[26]),
and non-monetary rewards (e.g., [21], [22]). For the first
category, Ghosh et al. in [15] considered that an individual
would participate if the privacy protection offered by the data
collector satisfies his privacy requirement. For the second cat-
egory of monetary payments, the studies in [16]–[20] focused
on the mechanism design that minimizes the data collector’s
total payment subject to computation accuracy constraints.
Crowd sensing (e.g., [23]–[26]) is one business practice of this
category. For example, Jin et al. in [23] designed an auction-
based incentive mechanism with data perturbation that ensures
workers’ privacy protection. Zhang et al. in [25] designed a
contract-based incentive mechanism that optimizes accuracy
subject to monetary budget by satisfying different privacy
preferences of different users. For the third category, the
studies in [21], [22], [27], [28] considered that individuals can
benefit from the data result computation, and focused on the
individuals’ trade-off between the privacy loss and the benefit.
References [27], [28] further studied the privacy-preserving
mechanism based on the individuals’ trade-off.
Our model and analysis fall into the third category, since
we do not rely on monetary payments but consider the
analysis-based reward. In our problem, an individual needs
to decide whether to participate in the data collection. In
3the studies in [21], [22], [27], [28], however, an individual
decides on the variance of noise to be added to his reported
data (as he will always participate). Moreover, regarding the
individuals’ decision modeling, none of the previous studies
(e.g., [15]–[28]) explored the behavioral economics modeling
of individuals.
Acquisti and Grossklags in [3], [4] suggested that behavioral
economics is a powerful tool to better understand the privacy-
related decision with empirical studies. However, they did not
detail any behavioral theoretic model together with realistic
privacy metric. In our work, we fill in this gap based on a prac-
tical privacy-preserving framework, and capture individuals’
behavior under uncertainty by applying the Prospect Theory
in behavioral economics.
The adoption of Prospect Theory to better design and
analyze engineering systems only emerged recently (e.g., [10]–
[13], [29]–[40]). For example, Li et al. in [10] studied a
random access game in wireless networks, and compared the
performance under Nash Equilibrium under for both Prospect
Theory and EUT settings. Yang et al. in [11] considered the
impact of user decision-making on radio resource pricing, and
proposed prospect pricing to improve radio resource manage-
ment. Xiao et al. in [13] formulated a static energy exchange
game between microgrids, and derived Nash Equilibrium to
analyze the selling and buying decisions based on Prospect
Theory. Saad et al. in [33] considered the security of integrated
circuit outsourcing, and captured the subjectivity of attacker
and defender with weighting effect in Prospect Theory. These
previous studies (e.g., [10], [11], [13], [30]–[33]) applied one
perspective of probability distortion in Prospect Theory. In
our work, we consider two perspectives of S-shape valuation
function and reference point to capture individuals’ subjective
perception of uncertainty. Due to the continuous nature of
privacy outcome, we will leave the more complicated analysis
of probability distortion in the future work. Furthermore, to
the best our knowledge, our work is the first theoretical re-
search exploring the application of Prospect Theory in privacy-
preserving mechanism design.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Our individuals’ decision model is based on the Prospect
Theory, and our privacy model is based on the widely used
theoretical framework of differential privacy with privacy
guarantee. In this section, we introduce the preliminaries on
Prospect Theory and differential privacy.
A. Prospect Theory
Compared with the widely-used modeling approach of
expected utility theory in economics, Prospect Theory better
captures practical human behavioral characteristics under un-
certainty. Prospect Theory suggests that an individual evaluates
an outcome with his subjective perception due to psychological
loss and risk preference. An S-shape asymmetrical valuation
function together with a reference point [7] (as shown in Fig
1) characterizes such a pattern:
v(x) =
{
(x − xre f )β, if x ≥ xre f
− λ(xre f − x)β, if x < xre f
. (1)
x
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Fig. 1: S-shape asymmetrical valuation function.
Here x represents the actual outcome, e.g., the amount of
money earned in the gambling. A larger x indicates a better
outcome. Parameter xre f represents the reference point, and
λ ≥ 1 and β ∈ (0, 1] are loss aversion parameter and risk
parameter, respectively. We will explain the physical meaning
of these parameters later. The valuation v(x) describes how
individual subjectively evaluates the actual outcome.
1) Reference Points: Reference point serves as the individ-
ual’s benchmark to evaluate the actual outcome. If the actual
outcome is higher than the reference point, the individual
will perceive it as a gain, due to a better outcome than his
anticipation (represented by his reference point). Otherwise,
he will perceive it as a loss. For example, an gambler targets
at earning 100 dollars, which is his reference point. Whenever
he earns less than 100 dollars (even though he indeed earns
some money), he would consider it as a loss.
2) Loss and Risk Parameters: The loss penalty parameter
λ captures the loss aversion level. As λ is often greater than
one, we know that the impact of the loss is larger than that
of the gain of the same absolute value. For example, when an
gambler losses 100 dollars, he feels as if he lost more than 100
dollars, due to his loss aversion attitude. A larger λ indicates
that he is more loss averse. The parameter β describes the
concavity of the gain part of the function and the convexity of
the loss part of the function, capturing the risk aversion level
toward the gain and the risk-seeking level toward the loss.
Finally, when β = λ = 1, the S-shape function degenerates
to a straight line, which corresponds to the Expected Utility
Theory [41] in the literature.
Finally, the prospect outcome is obtained by associating the
valuation function with probability weighting:
UPT =
∑
i
v(xi) · pi, (2)
where pi is the probability weighting associated with the
outcome xi .2
2The general formula of a prospect outcome also integrates probability
weighting distortion to pi . In this work, however, we do not consider the
weighting distortion for simplicity, since the continuous and infinite nature of
privacy outcome would complicate the associated weighting analysis.
4B. Differential Privacy
Definition 1 defines -differential privacy, which serves as
a basic framework to offer reliable privacy protection in the
related literature [16]–[20]. In the definition, one entry in
a database corresponds to one individual’s reported data. A
differentially private mechanism ensures that the result of the
computation will not change significantly when an individual’s
data is added to the database. This ensures that when the
computation result is revealed, an adversary can not easily
infer the information of an individual’s data without extra
information.
Definition 1. (-differential privacy) [14] A randomized
mechanism A is -differentially private if for any two neigh-
boring databases D,D′ that only differ in only one entry and
for any set S of outputs:
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp() · Pr[A(D′) ∈ S],
where Pr[·] denotes the probability of the event.
Consider the extreme case of  = 0, i.e., exp() = 1,
Definition 1 implies that Pr[A(D) ∈ S] = Pr[A(D′) ∈ S].
This means that any two neighboring databases will have
the same output distribution regardless of any single entry
difference, which means a perfect privacy protection. When
the value  becomes larger, the privacy protection becomes
weaker.
C. Laplace Mechanism
Laplace mechanism is a commonly used mechanism that
can ensure differential privacy for numerical data [14]–[17].
Such a mechanism adds random noise with a Laplace distri-
bution to the computation result and calibrates the standard
deviation of the noise according to the sensitivity of the
computation function (defined as follows).
Definition 2. (Sensitivity) [14] The sensitivity of a function
h : D → R is:
S(h) = max
D,D′∈D
| |h(D) − h(D′)| |,
for all neighboring databases D and D′ that differ in only one
entry.
The sensitivity of a function measures the maximum vari-
ation that any single variable can cause to the computation
result. For example, the mean function with the representation
h(X) = ∑
i
xi/n, where X = [x1, x2, ..., xn] is the collected data,
has the sensitivity of S(h) = xmax/n. Here, xmax = max
i
|xi |.
The frequency function (e.g., h(X) = |{xi |xi > 0}|/n that
indicates the proportion of positive data in the whole dataset),
has the sensitivity of 1/n.
A Laplace distribution, denoted by Lap(b) with the scale
parameter b, has a probability density function:
p(x) = 1
2b
exp(− |x |
b
). (3)
It has a zero mean and a standard deviation of
√
2b. By
calibrating the standard deviation according to the sensitivity
Non-monetary 
reward
Data collector
Data
Individuals
The reward can’t compensate 
for my privacy cost. No!
The reward is appealing. 
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… …
Designs a privacy-preserving 
mechanism
Fig. 2: System model: in Stage I, the data collector initiates a
collection with a privacy-preserving mechanism. In Stage II,
individuals decide whether to participate in the data collection.
of computation, the mechanism can achieve the differential
privacy.
Theorem 1. (Laplace mechanism) [14], [42] For any func-
tion h : D → R, the following Laplace mechanism can
achieve -differential privacy:
A(D) = h(D) + Y,
where Y is a random variable drawn from the Laplace
distribution Lap(S(h)/) (see Section 3.3 in [42] for a detailed
proof).
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 2 illustrates the system model of the privacy-preserving
data collection process. In this model, a data collector wants
to collect data from individuals, and provides an analysis-
based reward as an incentive. First, the data collector designs
a privacy-preserving mechanism. Second, individuals decide
whether to report data based on the trade-off between reward
and privacy loss. Next, we describe the individual’s partici-
pation problem and the data collector’s utility maximization
problem in Section IV-A and IV-B, respectively.
A. An individual’s Participation Problem
In this subsection, we formulate individuals’ participation
problem under the privacy protection uncertainty. We use
Prospect Theory to model individuals’ behavioral character-
istics in this context.
1) Privacy Measurement Based on Differential Privacy:
Based on Definition 1 of the -differential privacy, we regard
 as the privacy level for a given mechanism. Recall that a
larger value of  means a weaker privacy protection, and a
smaller value of  means stronger privacy protection.
As we can see from Definition 1, the privacy level involves
some inherent uncertainty. The parameter  corresponds to the
weakest privacy protection (or the highest privacy leakage)
among all possible neighboring databases. More specifically,
data from different participants (i.e., different entries) may
have different effects on the output, and this definition mea-
sures the most significant effect among all possible single
entries. So the actual privacy level of a particular participant
5under this mechanism can be uncertain. This motivates us to
use the Prospect Theory to model how a participant subjec-
tively responds when he concerns about the potential risk of
his actual privacy level.
2) Prospect Theoretic Model of an Individual’s Preference:
We first characterize individual’s subjective valuation on a
particular actual privacy level. By applying the S-shape asym-
metrical valuation function in (1), we obtain the valuation
function in our context:
v() =
{
(re f − )β, if  ≤ re f
− λ( − re f )β, if  > re f
, (4)
where 0 < β ≤ 1, λ ≥ 1, and re f is the reference point. One
main difference is that in (1), a larger value of x corresponds
to a better outcome, while in the differential privacy setting,
a smaller value of  corresponds to a better outcome of
protection. So if the privacy level  is lower than the reference
point re f , the individual would consider treat it as a gain.
Otherwise, he would treat it as a loss.
Next, we characterize the prospect privacy level given an
-differential private mechanism. A challenge of applying
the classical Prospect Theory in our setting comes from the
fact that we consider the continuous privacy level (while
most prospect theoretic analysis considered discrete outcomes,
e.g., [10], [11], [13], [29]–[32]). We adopt the result from
[43] to get around this issue, by approximating the infinite
number of continuous outcomes with a finite number of
discrete outcomes. More specifically, we decompose the set
of all possible continuous outcomes [0, ] into m discrete
outcomes i/m, i=1, 2, ...,m. Then a participant’s prospect
privacy level is the summation of weighted valuations of
all discrete outcomes piv(i/m), i=1, 2, ...,m, where pi is
the weighting (or probability) assigned to the corresponding
outcome. For computational simplicity, we assume that the
probability is evenly assigned to all the outcomes,3 then we
obtain the prospect privacy level under an -differentially
private mechanism as in (2):
p =
1
m
m∑
i=1
v
(
i
m

)
. (5)
3) Individuals’ Utility Maximization Problem: We will
derive the individuals’ utility maximization problem by dis-
cussing the privacy cost and the reward gain. We first introduce
the participants’ privacy cost and participation benefit, and
then introduce the non-participants’ privacy cost. The individ-
uals decide whether to participate after comparing two options.
Privacy Cost of a Participant: When a participant’s data
is used in an -differentially private mechanism, he will
experience a privacy cost that is associated with the privacy
level.4 Similar to [15]–[17], [25], we model this privacy cost as
a linear function of differential privacy level. Let g(p) denote
the linear function that maps the prospect differential privacy
level to privacy cost, i.e., g(p) = c · p . Here the parameter c
3By adopting the same method in [43], the calculation can be extended to
other distributions.
4We do not consider the privacy cost from membership or non-membership
to avoid trivial case. We only consider the privacy cost from participation when
his data is being used.
measures the privacy cost per privacy level. Since the data
collector gathers the same type of data for a computation
(e.g., income or movie rating), we assume that participants
experience the same cost parameter c (similar as in [19], [20]).
Regarding the prospect theoretic model parameters (i.e., re f ,
λ, and β), we will first assume that they are homogeneous
across all individuals in the analysis. Later in Section VII, we
will further numerically explore the impact of heterogeneous
parameters.
Participation Benefit: We assume that participants can ben-
efit from the non-monetary reward (e.g., computation analysis-
based reward and other formats of benefit) from the data
collector. For example, the participants contribute ratings on
movies and obtain movie recommendations in return. The
consumers report the experience of a product surveyed by a
company, which could help improve the product and provide
better service. The individuals’ benefit from data contribution
(e.g., their interest in uncovering new results) could be utilized
to incentivize their participations, which helps the data collec-
tor get rid of further monetary cost. The consideration of non-
monetary reward has not only been theoretically considered
and analyzed in [21], [22], but also has been implemented
in practical businesses [44]. To characterize the impact of the
benefit on individuals’ decisions, we consider an individual i’s
valuation on the benefit denoted by Wi (measured in the same
unit of the privacy cost). Different individuals might value the
benefit differently.
Privacy Cost of a Non-Participant: For a non-participating
individual, he will not get a reward from the data collector.
Furthermore, his actual privacy level is zero, i.e., perfect
privacy protection. Hence his utility is g(v(0)) = g(β
re f
). If
the reference point re f is positive,5 then not participating
indicates a “gain” of privacy. If the reference point re f is
zero, then the utility would be zero, meaning no gain or loss
of privacy.
Utility Maximization Problem: The utility of a participant
is the summation of benefit valuation and privacy cost, i.e.,
Wi + g(p) where the cost takes a negative value. The utility
of a non-participant is just his privacy cost. Each individual i
decides whether to participate in the data collection by solving
the following optimization problem:
max
ai
Ui(ai) = ai(Wi + g(p)) + (1 − ai)g(v(0))
s.t. ai ∈ {0, 1}.
(6)
Action ai = 1 means participation, and ai = 0 otherwise. Sim-
ilar to [16], [17], we assume the data collector is trustworthy,
hence all participants will truthfully report their data due to
the trusted data collector. 6
B. Data Collector’s Utility Maximization Problem
In this subsection, we discuss the data collector’s computa-
tion and utility function.
5A positive reference point could correspond to the case where the
individual believes that participating in the data collection is the social norm.
6The mechanism design problem involving untruthful data reporting due to
a potentially untrustworthy data collector would be much more complicated
[18]–[20], and we will study it in the future work.
6The data collector obtains data from individuals to perform
a data-driven computation. Throughout this paper, we consider
the case where the data collector wants to calculate the mean
of the collected numerical data.7 This kind of analysis has a
wide range of application scenarios. For example, the data
collector wants to investigate the average salary level of
residents in a district, or obtain the popularity of a new movie
by investigating the average score rated by audiences.
Then we discuss the components of the data collector’s util-
ity. She benefits more if she manages to collect more data, as it
enables more convincing computation result [45]. Meanwhile,
she adopts a differentially private mechanism (e.g., the Laplace
mechanism) that adds some random noise to the computation
result, which leads to an accuracy penalty. This implies that
the data collector’s utility function depends on two factors:
the amount of collected data and the accuracy penalty. Recall
that the data collector would provide non-monetary reward to
incentivize individuals. The reward naturally comes from the
data-driven analysis without incurring a significant additional
cost, as such an incentive is a by-product of the data analysis.
The data collector does not have an additional cost (in terms
of the incentives to individuals).
1) Data Collector’s Benefit: We use R(n) to denote the
data collector’s benefit of collecting data from n participants.
We assume that R(n) is non-negative, monotonic increasing,
strictly concave, and upper bounded. As n grows large, the
marginal benefit of collecting data from one more participant
reduces, hence the concavity shape of the function. Further-
more, the data amount is not the only factor that affects the
computation result. Other factors such as methods of repre-
sentation [45] and optimization all influence the computation
to some extent. Hence function R(n) would be bounded even
when n goes to infinity. For the ease of expose, we follow [46]
and use the following benefit function with the parameters k
and l in our analysis,
R(n, [k, l]) = 1 − k
1 + l · n . (7)
Here k > 0 and l > 0. Fig. 3 shows some examples of the
function with different values of k and l. The data collector
needs to adjust the values of k and l to match the exact benefit
of a particular application.
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
n
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
R
(n)
k=0.989, l=9.8×10-4
k=0.989, l=1.3×10-4
k=0.509, l=1.3×10-4
Fig. 3: Data amount benefit function R(n).
7Our general prospect theoretic privacy-preserving mechanism works for
any other scenarios or applications involving privacy protection uncertainty.
2) Data Collector’s Accuracy Penalty: Define l(x) as the
penalty if the added noise level is x. The penalty is more
significant if the noise multitude |x | is larger, so l(x) is non-
negative and nondecreasing in |x |. Similar to [47], [48], we
consider one of the possible representations, l(x) = x2, which
emphasizes the variance in the error. Meanwhile, recall in
Theorem 1 that the data collector can add Laplacian random
noise to ensure -differential privacy. Combining the proba-
bility density function in (3), we get the expected accuracy
penalty L() under -differential privacy as follows:
L() =
∫ +∞
−∞
l(x)p(x)dx = 2S(h)
2
2
. (8)
The data collector needs to choose the privacy level  to
maximize her utility, i.e.,
max
>0
Uc() = R(n()) − L(). (9)
Here n() is the number of participants under the -
differentially private mechanism, which will be derived based
on the individuals’ responses to the mechanism (as in Section
IV-A).
C. Problem Formulation
We formulate the overall system as a two-stage game, as
illustrated in Fig. 2. In Stage I, the data collector designs an
-differentially private mechanism to maximize its utility in
(9). In Stage II, each individual decides whether to participate
in the data collection to maximize her utility in (6). We
use backward induction to solve this two-stage optimization
problem.
V. SOLVING THE TWO-STAGE PROBLEM
A. Individual’s Decision-Making
We first consider the case where individuals’ reference point
is zero, which means that individuals are intolerant and expect
perfect privacy protection. Hence any privacy level induced in
the data collection process will be considered as a loss. We
will consider the case of a positive reference point later in
Section V-D.
We will derive the number of participants under an -
differential private mechanism. We first analyze individu-
als’ participation condition. In an individual’s participation
problem (6), the individual will decide to participate if and
only if Ui(1) ≥ Ui(0). Under the zero reference point, we
have g(v(0)) = g(β
re f
) = 0, and the condition becomes
Wi ≥ g(v(0)) − g(p) = −g(p).
We consider a group of N individuals. Let pv(W) denote the
probability density function of the reward valuation W among
the individuals. Then the number of individuals choosing to
participate in data collection is:
n() = N · Pr (W > −g(p)) = N ∫ ∞
−g(p )
pv(W)dW . (10)
We can show that n() is non-increasing with  . For the con-
venience of analysis, we let each individual’s reward valuation
W follows a uniform distribution in [0,Wmax] in the theoretical
analysis in Section V, i.e.,
7pv(W) =
{
1
Wmax
, if W ∈ [0,Wmax];
0, otherwise.
(11)
In Section VI, we will perform simulation studies based on
a more general truncated normal distribution (which includes
the uniform distribution as a special case).
B. Data Collector’s Optimal Differentially Private Mechanism
Next we solve the data collector’s utility maximization prob-
lem in (9). We assume that she possesses adequate information
of the target individuals, i.e., the privacy loss coefficient c, the
distribution pv(W) of reward valuation W , and Prospect Theory
parameters, by abundant previous data-related investigations.
Then she can decide the optimal  to maximize her utility
based on the anticipation of individuals’ reactions.
Recall that we consider the mean analysis of numerical data
as an example in this work. The range of the data is normalized
from zero to one. The sensitivity of this computation is S(h) =
1/n. Then the accuracy penalty is:
L() = 2S(h)
2
2
=
2
n22
. (12)
We substitute (10), (11) and (12) to the data collector’s
utility maximization problem (9) and obtain a one-variable
optimization problem. It is difficult to obtain the closed-
form optimal solution, as the derivative of the objective
function involves a high-and-fractional-order polynomial. We
can apply many effective one-dimensional search methods [49]
to numerically solve this problem. To gain useful insights
for the practical implementation, nevertheless, we would like
to derive an analytical solution by taking some reasonable
approximations.
Next, we describe how to derive the approximated optimal
solution of (9) under a large population approximation. We
first simplify the derivative formulation and reduce the order
by considering that the population size N is large enough, and
further get around the fractional order by considering that the
parameter β = 1. We then can compute the unique root of
the derivative in the feasible set, which is the approximated
optimal solution.
More specifically, let us consider the feasible set of  such
that there is at least one participant (i.e, n() > 0) according
to (10) and (11): {
 : −g(p) < Wmax
}
. (13)
We can compute the data collector’s objective function in
(9) together with its derivative as follows:
Uc() = 1 − k
1 + lNWmax+g(p )Wmax
− 2
N22
(
Wmax+g(p )
Wmax
)2 , (14)
and
U ′c() =
klN g
′(p )
Wmax[
1 + lNWmax+g(p )Wmax
]2 + 4N2 Wmax+g(p )+g
′(p )
Wmax[
Wmax+g(p )
Wmax
]3
3
. (15)
One of the key challenges of analytically computing the root
of U ′c() = 0 is due to the six-order polynomial at the numer-
ator after combining the terms. However, we can approximate
1+lN
(
Wmax + g(p)
) /(Wmax) with lN (Wmax + g(p)) /(Wmax)
when the population size N is large. Hence we can obtain an
approximated (denoted by the superscript a) version of (15):
U ′ac () =
4(
Wmax+g(p )
Wmax
)3
3N2
f (), (16)
where
f () =
(
Wmax + g(p)
Wmax
) (
1 +
kN
4l
3
g′(p)
Wmax
)
+ 
g′(p)
Wmax
. (17)
We can compute the root of f () = 0 in the feasible as the
approximated optimal solution, which is unique.
Theorem 2. Under the approximation of (15), we obtain the
unique approximated optimal solution8 ˜∗ of the problem (9)
in closed form as the root of f () = 0.
We provide the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A, includ-
ing the detailed closed-form expression of the approximated
optimal solution. The approximation enables us to derive a
simplified polynomial function f (), which makes it math-
ematically tractable and straightforward to study the impact
of Prospect Theory parameters on the optimal mechanism
solution (as we will do in Sections V-C and V-D). The
polynomial function serves as a bridge connecting Prospect
Theory parameters and the optimal solution.
C. Comparison with EUT
In this section, we focus on the traditional EUT case [41],
which has been widely used in most prior literature (e.g., [15]–
[28]) when dealing with uncertainty. Basically, EUT explains
an individual’s decision by evaluating the expected outcome
(or utility) under uncertainty without considering risk and loss
attitudes. EUT can be considered as a special case of Prospect
Theory when we choose λ = 1 and β = 1 in (1). We compare
the result of the data collector’s approximated optimal solution
under the EUT case with that under the general Prospect
Theory case (excluding the special case of EUT).
Corollary 1. The data collector’s approximated optimal ˜∗e
under the EUT case is higher than that under the general
Prospect Theory case.
We provide the proof of Corollary 1 in Appendix B. We
conclude that compared with traditional EUT modeling, the
data collector should adopt a more conservative privacy-
preserving mechanism when considering the individuals’ loss
attitude predicted by the Prospect Theory. Without doing
so, she will suffer a utility loss for not properly capturing
individuals’ behavioral characteristics.
8We use notation ˜ to represent an approximated optimal solution.
8D. Impact of Prospect Theory Parameters
To better understand the insights from Theorem 2, we study
the impact of Prospect Theory parameters on the optimal
differentially private mechanism in this section. Note that these
parameters are intrinsic properties of individuals that the data
collector can not control. The data collector needs to design
the mechanism based on individuals’ prospect properties.
1) Impact of the Loss Aversion Parameter λ: We first look
at the impact of the Prospect Theory parameters λ under the
case of a zero reference point.
Corollary 2. The data collector’s optimal ˜∗ decreases in λ.
We provide the proof of Corollary 2 in Appendix C. Corol-
lary 2 suggests that if the individuals are more loss averse (i.e.,
with a larger loss aversion parameter λ), they are less likely
to participate in the data collection due to serious concerns
of privacy loss. In order to attract individuals’ participation,
the data collector needs to adopt a more conservative privacy-
preserving mechanism to alleviate the concerns.
2) Impact of the Reference Point re f : Recall that a positive
reference point means that individuals are tolerant. They would
perceive a privacy level outcome as a gain if it is better
than the reference even though it is not a perfect protection.
Intuitively, the data collector can take advantage of individu-
als’ tolerance towards privacy, and adopt a less conservative
privacy-preserving mechanism comparing with the case of a
zero reference point. However, is this intuition always true?
Next, we will try to answer this question.
We compare the case of a positive reference point with a
zero reference point. The methodology of computing the data
collector’s approximated optimal privacy-preserving mecha-
nism under a large population approximation is similar to that
under the case of a zero reference point. The main difference
lies in the characterization of the prospect privacy levels of
both participation and non-participation.
Under the case of a positive reference point, the prospect
privacy level of participation based on (5) is (with the subscript
pos and superscript p):

p
pos =
t
m
t∑
i=1
(
re f − im 
)β
−
(
1 − t
m
)
λ
m∑
i=t+1
(
i
m
 − re f
)β
,
for t satisfying
t
m
 < re f and
t + 1
m
 > re f .
(18)
The first summation term of (18) corresponds to the gain part,
and the second summation term corresponds to the loss part.
The prospect privacy level of non-participation is (with the
subscript pos and superscript n):
npos = 
β
re f
. (19)
Individuals would always enjoy certain gain from non-
participation due to a better privacy protection than the positive
reference level.
Let U ′apos() (formulated below) be the approximated deriva-
tive of the objective function and fpos() be the polynomial
numerator in U ′apos(). Comparing the polynomial part fpos()
with f () in (17) under the case of a zero reference point,
we can see that the term g(p) in (17) is replaced by the
term g( ppos)−g(npos) in (21). Then the approximated optimal
solution ˜∗pos under the case of a positive reference point is the
root of fpos() = 0 in the feasible set { : g(npos) − g( ppos) <
Wmax}.
U ′apos() =
4(
Wmax+g( ppos )−g(npos ))
Wmax
)3
3N2
fpos(), (20)
and
fpos() =
(
Wmax +
g( ppos) − g(npos)
Wmax
)
×(
1 +
kN
4l
3
g′( ppos) − g′(npos)
Wmax
)
− g
′(npos) − g′( ppos)
Wmax
 .
(21)
We compare the data collector’s optimal privacy-preserving
mechanism under both the cases of a positive reference point
and a zero reference point. Remind that ˜∗ is the approximated
optimal solution under the case of a zero reference point, i.e,
f (˜∗) = 0.
Theorem 3. Comparing ˜∗pos with ˜∗, we have the following
result:
• When fpos(˜∗) < 0 is true, ˜∗pos < ˜∗.
• When fpos(˜∗) > 0 is true, ˜∗pos > ˜∗.
• When fpos(˜∗) = 0 is true, ˜∗pos = ˜∗.
We provide the proof of Theorem 3 in Appendix D. The-
orem 3 indicates that a positive reference point (representing
individuals’ tolerance to the privacy issue) does not necessarily
lead to a less conservative privacy-preserving mechanism. In
contrast, the data collector needs to adopt a more conservative
mechanism under a certain condition, i.e., fpos(˜∗) < 0, under
the case of a positive reference point. More specifically, the
condition fpos(˜∗) < 0 holds if the loss aversion parameter
λ is relatively small or the risk parameter β is relatively
high. Both indicate that individuals are not sensitive to loss.
When the reference point re f changes from zero to positive,
the perceived privacy protection gain from non-participation
is more significant and overweights the loss reduction of
participation. So individuals would prefer not to participate.
In this case, the data collector needs to enforce a more
conservative privacy protection to encourage the individuals
to participate.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND INSIGHTS
In this section, we evaluate the proposed privacy-preserving
data collection mechanism from a variety of perspectives,
including the approximation performance, the impact of accu-
rate prospect theoretic modeling, and the impact of Prospect
Theory parameters.
A. The Accuracy of the Approximated Solution
First, we compare the optimal solution with and without
approximation under different values of population size N
9O
p
ti
m
al
 
an
d
 
ap
p
ro
xi
m
at
ed
 o
p
ti
m
al
 
Fig. 4: Comparison between optimal ∗ with and without
approximation vs. N .
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and parameter β. The result with approximation is calculated
according to Theorem 2, and the result without approximation
is obtained by an exhaustive search. We change the population
size N , and we compare the approximated solution ˜∗ under
β = 1 with the optimal solution ∗ under different values of
β.
Fig. 4 shows that both the approximated and the optimal
solutions decrease in N . This is because a larger number
of participants can potentially provide a higher accuracy in
data computation, which reduces the data collector’s accuracy
penalty due to the added noise. To attract more participants,
the data collector would prefer to adopt a more conservative
privacy-preserving mechanism. 9
Comparing the two curves under β = 1, we see that the
gap due to the approximation is relatively small, and such a
gap decreases in N . For example, as N changes from 4000 to
40000, the relative difference between ˜∗ with approximation
and ∗ without approximation decreases from 8.7% to 5.2%.
This is because when N becomes larger, the large population
approximation becomes more accurate.
B. The Impact of Prospect Theory Parameters
In this subsection, we study the impact of Prospect Theory
parameters λ, β, and the reference point re f . We consider a
general truncated normal distribution [50] for the individuals’
9On the other hand, this does not mean that the data collector would include
all the individuals. Since the optimal  ∗ is non-zero, i.e., the privacy protection
is imperfect, there may always exist some individuals who are reluctant to
participate. The data collector needs to trade-off the balance between data
amount benefit and accuracy penalty by optimizing the value of  ∗.
reward valuation. The uniform distribution used in the theo-
retic analysis is a special case of truncated normal distribution
when the variance approaches infinity. In this and the later
simulations, we use the optimal solution ∗ without approxi-
mation as the measurement of privacy-preserving mechanism.
We will see that the simulation results match the theoretical
results that we obtained through approximation in Section V.
We first focus on parameters λ and β for a zero reference
point case. Fig. 5 shows that the data collector’s optimal solu-
tion ∗ decreases in the loss aversion parameter λ and increases
in the risk aversion parameter β. Intuitively, the loss aversion
parameter λ is larger or the parameter β is smaller, individuals
would subjectively experience more serious privacy loss once
choosing participation. So the data collector needs to adopt a
more conservative privacy-preserving mechanism to encourage
individuals’ participation.
We then focus on the reference point re f . A higher re f
means that individuals are more tolerant about their privacy
loss. We set the positive reference point re f to 0.01. Fig.6
shows the difference of optimal solution between the case of a
positive reference point and a zero reference point (i.e., ∗pos−
∗) under different values of parameters λ and β.
We first focus on the bottom right region in Fig. 6 where
λ is large (i.e., λ ≥ 2) and β is small( i.e., β ≤ 0.5).
The difference ∗pos − ∗ is positive in this region, i.e., the
data collector offers a less conservative privacy-preserving
mechanism with a positive reference point. This is because
in this region individuals are very sensitive to loss (see Fig.
1). When re f increases from zero, a participant is less likely
to experience loss, hence the subjectively perceived privacy
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cost from participation significantly decreases. Such a privacy
loss tolerance attitude allows the data collector to adopt a less
conservative privacy-preserving mechanism.
Next, we consider the upper left region in Fig. 6 where
λ is small(i.e., λ ≤ 1.5) or β is large (i.e., β > 0.5).
The difference ∗pos − ∗ is negative in this region, i.e., the
data collector offers a more conservative privacy-preserving
mechanism with a positive reference point. This is because in
this region individuals are less sensitive to loss (see Fig. 4).
So when re f increases from zero, the reduction of privacy
protection loss from participation is less significant compared
with privacy protection gain from non-participation. Hence the
data collector needs to enforce a more conservative privacy
protection to encourage the individuals to participate.
C. The Impact of Prospect Theoretic Modeling Accuracy
In this subsection, we show the importance when using
an accurate prospect theoretic modeling. In Section V-C,
Corollary 1 shows that a data collector should adopt a more
conservative privacy-preserving mechanism when considering
the prospect theoretic characteristics of individuals. However,
if the data collector assumes that individuals make decisions
based on EUT (while the actual decisions are made based on
Prospect Theory), she can suffer a significant utility loss.
Fig. 7 shows the relative utility loss (normalized by the
maximum utility) when the mismatch happens under different
Prospect Theory parameters λ and β for a zero reference point
case. We see that the loss increases significantly when the
parameters λ and β deviate from EUT case (which corresponds
to λ = 1 and β = 1). For example, when λ = 4.5 and β = 0.88,
the utility loss is about 14%. This indicates the importance for
the data collector to have an accurate estimation of the users’
Prospect Theory parameters through extensive data collection
and analysis.
VII. IMPACT OF THE HETEROGENEITY OF INDIVIDUALS
Previous analysis and simulations in Sections V and VI are
based on the assumption of homogeneous individuals. Here
we numerically study a more realistic situation where differ-
ent individuals may have different behavior characterizations
[51]–[54], and explore the impact of such heterogeneity on
the data collector’s optimal privacy-preserving mechanism. We
will leave the analytical study of the heterogeneous parameter
model in the future work.
We first want to understand the distribution of Prospect
Theory parameters in real life. The data comes from the
literature in the area of psychology and behavioral economics
that investigated the Prospect Theory parameters of each
subject in the experiments (e.g., [51]–[54]). More specifically,
we utilize the experimental results in [52].10 Fig. 8 shows the
10The experiments are based on subjects’ reactions under monetary reward,
instead of privacy protection. Monetary reward is widely used in psychological
experiments and the corresponding literature. The purpose of utilizing these
reported data in the literature is to provide a relative realistic context in terms
of the Prospect Theory parameter choices, instead of randomly generating
these parameters. Our theoretical results apply for any Prospect Theory
parameter settings, and it is important future work to perform field studies
to understand the actual parameters in the privacy preserving contexts for
populations of different age, sex, education background, and countries.
(a) λ ∼ Gamma (3.24,0.60).
(b) β ∼ Gamma (12.87,0.06).
Fig. 8: Probability density of parameters λ and β based on the
data from [52].
empirical probability density of parameters β and λ based on
the data from [52]. We perform data fitting by using the chi-
squared test [55], we conclude that the parameter λ follows
a Gamma distribution with a shape parameter kλ = 3.2433
and a scale parameter θλ = 0.6018 (p = 0.4768), and that
the parameter β follows a Gamma distribution with a shape
parameter kβ = 12.8662 and a scale parameter θβ = 0.0583
(p = 0.1278).11
Utilizing the above empirical data, we will study the im-
pact of the heterogeneity of parameter λ. We generate this
parameter through the Gamma distribution with a fixed mean
(µλ = kλ × θλ = 1.95) based on Fig. 8a and different values
of variance. We fix other parameters including the parameter
β = kβ × θβ = 0.75 and the reference point re f = 0.
Fig. 9 shows how the data collector’s optimal ∗ changes
with the variance of λ. We can see that the optimal ∗ firstly
decreases in the variance and then increases in the variance.
To better understand such an impact, we visualize individuals’
participation in Fig. 10 given the optimal ∗ under different
variances of λ (in an increasing order). Those with the lower
value of λ (less loss aversion) would participate and the
corresponding threshold changes with the variance.
Combining Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, we are able to illustrate the
intuition. At a low diversity level (small variance such as in
Fig. 10a), most individuals’ λ values are close to the mean.
Comparing Fig. 10a (small variance) and Fig. 10b (medium
variance), we can see that as the variance becomes larger,
there are more individuals with λ values further away from
the mean. To attract those individuals with λ values higher
than the mean, the data collector needs to adopt a more
conservative privacy-preserving mechanism when the variance
increases. A more conservative mechanism corresponds to a
11The mean of the Gamma distributed random variable is the product of
the shape parameter k and the scale parameter θ, i.e., k · θ.
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Fig. 10: Participation under different variance of λ.
larger participation threshold (3.13) in Fig. 10b than that (2.82)
in Fig. 10a.
However, at a high diversity level (as in Fig. 10c), individ-
uals’ λ values spread around a big range. Comparing Fig. 10b
(medium variance) and Fig. 10c (large variance), we can see
that as the variance becomes very large, more individuals have
very high λ values. Those individuals are more loss averse and
are difficult to be motivated to participate. In this case, a more
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Fig. 11: Impact of variance of β on optimal ∗.
conservative mechanism to attract those individuals would
result in more accuracy penalty due to a larger variance of the
added noise. Instead, it would be better for the data collector
to ignore those with very high λ values and to consider a
relatively less conservative mechanism. A less conservative
mechanism corresponds to a smaller participation threshold
(2.95) in Fig. 10c than that (3.13) in Fig. 10b.
We also study the impact of the heterogeneity of parameter
β. Similarly, we generate the parameter β through the Gamma
distribution with a fixed mean (µβ = kβ × θβ = 0.75) based on
Fig. 8b and different values of variance. We fix λ = kλ × θλ =
1.95 and re f = 0. Fig. 11 shows the optimal ∗ under different
variances of β. The pattern is similar to that in Fig. 9: the
optimal ∗ firstly decreases and then increases in the variance
of β. The corresponding insights are also the same as that
from the parameter λ.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed a privacy-preserving data col-
lection problem with the privacy protection uncertainty. To
the best our knowledge, this is the first theoretical study of
Prospect Theory application in the area of privacy protection.
We demonstrate the importance of a realistic and accurate
individual decision modeling to the privacy-preserving mech-
anism design. Considering the loss and risk attitudes based on
prospect theoretic modeling, the data collector should adopt
a more conservative privacy-preserving mechanism compared
with the one derived based on the expected utility theory
modeling. Moreover, a more tolerant attitude on privacy loss
predicted by a positive reference point does not always indicate
a less conservative mechanism.
For the future work, we will consider the case where the
participants can misreport their data. For example, the partici-
pant would like to protect his privacy on his own by reporting a
noisy version of data. Considering both the risk aversion and
loss aversion of the participants, the data collector needs to
design an incentive mechanism that effectively induces truthful
reporting from the users.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof consists of three steps. We first derive the number
of participants in Stage II as a function of  . We then obtain
the data collector’s utility as a function of  and its derivate.
We finally approximate the derivative and obtain the unique
root in the feasible set, which is the approximated optimal
solution.
Step 1: Based on (10) and (11), we compute the number of
participants among all individuals as a function of  :
n() =
{
NWmax+g(p )Wmax , if − g(p) < Wmax;
0, otherwise.
(22)
Recall that N is the number of all individuals. Here g(p) =
−Mβ based on (5) where M = cλ/m(1/m)β ∑mi=1 iβ . Since
β = 1 we have g(p) = −M where M = cλ(m + 1)/(2m).
Step 2: We derive the data collector’s utility as a func-
tion of  and its derivate. We consider the nontrivial case
−g(p) < Wmax, such that there always exists some individuals
who would like to participate. So we have the feasible set:
{ : −g(p) < Wmax}. (23)
Recall that p is the prospect privacy level of participation un-
der the -differentially private mechanism. The data collector’s
utility function and its derivative are as follows:
Uc() = 1 − k
1 + lNWmax+g(p )Wmax
− 2
N22
(
Wmax+g(p )
Wmax
)2
,
(24)
and
U ′c() =
klN
g′p ( )
Wmax[
1 + lNWmax+g(p )Wmax
]2 + 4N2 Wmax+g(p )+g
′(p )
Wmax[
Wmax+g(p )
Wmax
]3
3
. (25)
Step 3: We approximate the derivative to find the
approximated optimal solution. We approximate 1 +
lN
(
Wmax + g(p)
) /(Wmax) with lN (Wmax + g(p)) /(Wmax),
considering a large population size N . Then we can obtain an
approximated (denoted by the superscript a) version of (25):
U ′ac () =
4(
Wmax+g(p )
Wmax
)3
3N2
f (). (26)
Here
f () =
(
Wmax + g(p)
Wmax
) (
1 +
kN
4l
3
g′(p)
Wmax
)
+ 
g′(p)
Wmax
, (27)
where g() = −M and g′(p) is the derivative, i.e., g′(p) =
−M .
As in the feasible set of  in (23) we have Wmax+g(p) > 0
in (26), computing the root of U ′ac = 0 is equivalent to
computing the root of the polynomial part f () = 0. The
equation f () = 0 has two real roots as follows:
L =
Wmax
4M
+
r1
2
− r2
2
, H =
Wmax
4M
+
r1
2
+
r2
2
, (28)
where
r1 =
√
A1 +
A2
A3
+
A3
A4
, r2 =
√
2A1 − A2A3 −
A3
A4
+
A5
4r1
,
A1 =
(Wmax)2
4M2
, A2 = 2 · 21/3W2max,
A3 = (216CM4W2max + 27C2M2W4max +
√
B1,
B1 = −864C3M6W6max + (108CM4W2max + 27C2M2W4max)2)
1
3 ,
A4 = 3 · 21/3CM2, A5 = 32σWCM +
W3max
M3
.
Next, we show that there is a unique root of f () = 0
in the feasible set (0,Wmax/M) (which is equivalent to (23)),
while the other one is not in the feasible set. First, we show
that the function f () is continuous, f (0) · f (Wmax/M) < 0,
and f (Wmax/M) · f (+∞) < 0. This implies that the equation
f1() = 0 has at least one root in (0,Wmax/M) and at least one
root in (Wmax/M,+∞). Together with (28), we know that the
unique root in (0,Wmax/M) is L . 
B. Proof of Corollary 1
The proof consists of two steps. We first obtain the approx-
imated optimal solution under the EUT case, similar to that
under the PT case. We then compare the approximated optimal
solutions of both cases.
Step 1: We obtain the approximated optimal solution under
the EUT case similarly to that under the PT case. Recall
that when λ = 1 and β = 1, (4) corresponds to the EUT
representation. We denote the privacy level of participation
with the EUT representation under the -differentially private
mechanism as e (we use this to characterize the feasible
set later for the ease of presentation). The privacy cost of
participation for the EUT case is given by g(e) = −Me
,where Me = c2 based on (5).
Let
fe() =
(
Wmax + g(e)
Wmax
) (
1 +
kN
4l
3
g′(e)
Wmax
)
+ 
g′(e)
Wmax
(29)
be the polynomial part of the approximated derivative. Here
g′(e) is the derivative, i.e., g′(e) = −Me. Let ˜∗e be the root
of fe() = 0 in the feasible set { : −g(e) < Wmax}, i.e., the
approximated optimal solution for the EUT case.
Step 2: We compare the approximated optimal solution ˜∗e
for the EUT case with ˜∗ for the general PT case (excluding
the EUT case). Recall that in the proof of Theorem 2, we have
f () =
(
Wmax + g(p)
Wmax
) (
1 + C
M
Wmax
3g′(p)
)
+ 
g′(p)
Wmax
and ˜∗ is the root of f () = 0. Based on the difference of
characteristics between PT modeling and EUT modeling, we
have
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fe(˜∗e ) =
(
Wmax + g(p)
Wmax
) (
1 +
kN
4l
˜∗3e
g′(p)
Wmax
)
+ ˜∗e
g′(p)
Wmax
<
(
Wmax + g(e)
Wmax
) (
1 +
kN
4l
˜∗3e
g′(e)
Wmax
)
+ ˜∗e
g′(e)
Wmax
= fe(˜∗e ) = 0.
(30)
The inequality holds for the following reasons. First, we
have
g(p) < g(e) ⇔ −λc2 
β < − c
2
 . (31)
The absolute value of privacy cost under the general Prospect
Theory modeling is larger than that under the EUT modeling.
Second, we have
g′(p) < g′(e) ⇔ −λcβ2 
β−1 < − c
2
. (32)
The increasing rate of the absolute value of privacy cost under
general Prospect Theory modeling is larger than that under
EUT modeling.
Since f1(0) > 0 and f1(˜∗e ) < 0, we have f1(0)· f1(˜∗e ) < 0. So
˜∗, the root of f1() = 0, is in the interval (0, ˜∗e ), i.e., ˜∗ < ˜∗e .
This completes the proof. 
C. Proof of Corollary 2
The proof consists of two steps. We first characterize the
approximated optimal solution. We then compare the approx-
imated optimal solutions of both cases.
Step 1: We characterize the approximated optimal solution
through the approximated derivative of the objective function
under both cases. Consider two cases: one with a higher value
of parameter λ1 and the other with a lower value of λ2. Let
fλ1 () =
(
Wmax + g(λ1 )
Wmax
) (
1 +
kN
4l
3
g′(λ1 )
Wmax
)
+ 
g′(λ1 )
Wmax
(33)
be the corresponding polynomial part of the approximated
derivative for the case of λ = λ1. Here the privacy cost is
g(p3 ) = −λ1c(m + 1)β/m. Let
fλ2 () =
(
Wmax + g(λ2 )
Wmax
) (
1 +
kN
4l
3
g′(λ2 )
Wmax
)
+ 
g′(λ2 )
Wmax
(34)
be the corresponding polynomial part of the approximated
derivative for the case of λ = λ2. Here the privacy cost is
g(λ2 ) = −λ2c(m + 1)β/m.
Let ˜∗λ1 be the root of fλ1 () = 0 and ˜∗λ2 be the root of
fλ2 () = 0. Then ˜∗λ1 and ˜∗λ2 are the approximated optimal
solution of the case of λ = λ1 and λ = λ2, respectively.
Step 2: We compare the approximated optimal solutions
of both cases through comparing the polynomial part of the
approximated derivatives. Based on the difference of the PT
characteristics between both cases, we have
fλ1 (˜∗λ2 ) =
(
Wmax + g(λ1 )
Wmax
) (
1 +
kN
4l
˜∗3λ2
g′(λ1 )
Wmax
)
+ ˜∗λ2
g′(λ1 )
Wmax
<
(
Wmax + g(λ2 )
Wmax
) (
1 +
kN
4l
˜∗3λ2
g′(λ2 )
Wmax
)
+ ˜∗λ2
g′(λ2 )
Wmax
= fλ2 (˜∗λ2 ) = 0.
(35)
The inequality holds due to the following reasons. First, we
have
g(λ1 ) < g(λ2 ) ⇔ −λ1
c(m + 1)
m
β < −λ2 c(m + 1)m 
β . (36)
Second, we have
g′(λ1 ) < g′(λ2 ) ⇔ −βλ1
c(m + 1)
m
β−1 < −βλ2 c(m + 1)m 
β−1.
(37)
Since fλ1 (0) > 0 and fλ1 (˜∗λ2 ) < 0, we have fλ1 (0)· fλ1 (˜∗λ2 ) <
0. So ˜∗λ1 , the root of fλ1 () = 0, is in the interval (0, ˜∗λ2 ),
i.e, ˜∗λ1 < ˜
∗
λ2
. Thus, the approximated optimal solution ˜∗
decreases in the parameter λ. This completes the proof. 
D. Proof of Theorem 3
The proof consists of two steps. We first obtain the approx-
imated optimal solution. We then compare the approximated
optimal solutions of both cases.
Step 1: We characterize the approximated optimal solution
through the approximated derivative of the objective function
under the case of a positive reference point. The prospect
privacy level of participation based on (5) is as follow (with
subscript pos and superscript p):

p
pos =
t
m
t∑
i=1
(
re f − im 
)β
−
(
1 − t
m
)
λ
m∑
i=t+1
(
i
m
 − re f
)β
,
for t satisfying
t
m
 < re f and
t + 1
m
 > re f .
(38)
The first summation term corresponds to the gain part, and the
second summation term corresponds to the loss part.
The prospect privacy level of non-participation is as follow
(with subscript pos and superscript n):
npos = 
β
re f
. (39)
The implementation to obtain the approximated derivative
of the objective function is similar to that under the case of
a zero reference point. Let U ′apos() (formulated below) be the
approximated derivative of the objective function and fpos()
be the polynomial part in U ′apos():
U ′apos() =
4(
Wmax+g( ppos )−g(npos ))
Wmax
)3
3N2
fpos(), (40)
and
fpos() =
(
Wmax +
g( ppos) − g(npos)
Wmax
)
×(
1 +
kN
4l
3
g′( ppos) − g′(npos)
Wmax
)
− g
′(npos) − g′( ppos)
Wmax
 .
(41)
Let ˜∗pos be the root of fpos() = 0 in the feasible set
{ : g(npos) − g( ppos) < Wmax}. i.e., the approximated optimal
solution for the case of a positive reference point.
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Step 2: We compare the approximated optimal solutions
of both cases through comparing the polynomial part of the
approximated derivatives. Recall that ˜∗ the root of f () = 0,
i.e., the approximated optimal solution under the case of a
zero reference point. If
fpos(˜∗) < 0, (42)
since fpos(0) > 0, then we have fpos(0) · fpos(˜∗) < 0, i.e.,
˜∗pos is in the interval (0, ˜∗). So we have ˜∗pos < ˜∗. If
fpos(˜∗) > 0, (43)
then ˜∗pos is outside the interval (0, ˜∗). So we have ˜∗ < ˜∗pos .
If
fpos(˜∗) = 0, (44)
then ˜∗ is also the root of fpos() = 0. Based on the definition
of ˜∗pos , we have ˜∗ = ˜∗pos . Recall that there is only one root
in the feasible set in the proof of Theorem 2. This completes
the proof. 
